No cON Name congress (2026)

No cON Name is the oldest active hacking and IT security conference in Spain. Established in 1999, the first edition took place in Mallorca, and the come back to Mallorca. We are a non-profit association. Our events are open to anyone eager to share knowledge and engage with our vision of Hacking and IT Security (aka Cybersecurity). Here you can learn with no commercial bias, no sponsors (as much as possible) and meet people confortably. We thrive thanks to the support of our participants, we take pride in being one of the most independent conferences

No cON Name staff

Organization

With the collaboration of:

 

Singularities

Eldest
20 editions
Villages
Share activities in the same area parallel to talks
Workshops throughout the year
We designed [NcN Labs] to stay tunned and create community in Barcelona in the cybersecurity area.
Discussion Forums
addressing current topics and current trends in cybersecurity
 

Cybersecurity Track

 
IT security (aka cybersecurity) is becoming necessity for everyone (people and organizations) every day. In our event we aim to bring together enthusiasts and professionals in the field from different fields to share the results of research in a talk/workshop format. Our conference has been on the scene for many years, where a significant part of the country's hacker and cybersecurity professionals have participated.

Within the frame of reference where we are located, we can boast of being the most avant-garde, traditional and independent conference.

For several editions (2), we have wanted to open ourselves to the rest of the world using English as a unifying tool. We invite everyone come to our conference and Barcelona. On the other hand, we have not ruled out our mother tongues, which will always be part of our identity.

Join Cybersecurity Track

The second and third days of the conference will be dedicated to this track. The event consists of two days full of talks, and forum discussion in CAT/ES/ENG languages.

The final list will be published in this section on October, the 20th, meanwhile we will be publishing bits of information about talks and speakers.

Accepted speakers

This section is being updated every day

Bypassing 802.1x network authentication by hijacking IP and MAC in Ethernet environments

Marcin Ochab


The presentation will demonstrate the feasibility of bypassing 802.1X by establishing an Ethernet implant between the end device and the switch. Furthermore, it will be shown that network access is possible with the same IP and MAC address as the bypassed device, without interfering with its functionality or configuration. The implant is based on Raspberry Pi CM4 (Compute Module 4) and DFRobot DFR0767 Ethernet board. Allows remote access with WiFi or LTE modem. It uses Linux Network Namespaces and Virtual Ethernet (Veth) to connect two TCP/IP stacks via virtual interfaces. Such a configuration is needed to perform double DNAT and SNAT, which allows the use of the same IP address by the original bypassed device and the implant at the same time. Using ebtables, traffic is divided - IP is directed to double NAT, and 802.1X is bridged by a reconfigured module to disable standard filtering of some packets as a regular switch. At first, all the traffic is bridged, and the network configuration is obtained by a simple script using the scapy library. After successful reconnaissance, the implant is switched to double NAT mode and allows access to the internal network using the original IP address of the bypassed device. MAC addresses are automatically cloned. As will be presented on the live demo, an implant can be used not only to access the network but also to perform MitM attacks, especially on MS SQL and RDP protocols, where self-signed certificates are very often used.
Researcher, penetration tester, red team operator, and security consultant at LevelBlue SpiderLabs. I am also a cybersecurity lecturer at the University of Rzeszów in Poland and the discoverer of several CVEs mostly on leading ERP systems. Ph.D. in computer science from the AGH University of Science and Technology and am an automation and robotics engineer. https://www.ur.edu.pl/pl/pracownik/strony-pracownicze/marcin-ochab

Unlocking cars with Proxmark3: Turning an RFID Research Platform into an active LF transmitter for PKES attacks

Joel Serna Moreno


Esta investigación demuestra cómo reutilizar un Proxmark3, una plataforma diseñada para investigación RFID/NFC, para convertirlo en un transmisor activo de baja frecuencia (125 kHz) mediante modulación OOK. Para ello se modifica el firmware, se reutilizan componentes existentes del firmware y de la FPGA y se añaden nuevos comandos al cliente. El objetivo es demostrar que un dispositivo existente puede adquirir capacidades completamente nuevas sin necesidad de diseñar hardware específico. Proxmark3 es considerado la plataforma de referencia en la investigación de seguridad RFID y NFC. En baja frecuencia (LF) ofrece un soporte avanzado para la interceptación (sniffing), la lectura de tags actuando como lector, y la emulación de tags. Sin embargo, todas estas operaciones siguen patrones predefinidos: o bien escucha, o bien lee etiquetas conocidas, o bien las emula. Lo que no contempla su firmware es transmitir una señal arbitraria propia, modulada libremente a voluntad. En esta charla se mostrará el proceso realizado para conseguir que un Proxmark3 pueda generar y transmitir una señal LF arbitraria mediante modulación activa OOK (On-Off Keying), reutilizando y modificando las capacidades existentes del dispositivo de una forma para la que no estaba pensado. Se explicará cómo se consiguió controlar la portadora para reproducir cualquier secuencia de datos capturada previamente o en tiempo real, con la precisión temporal necesaria para que un sistema receptor la reconozca como válida. Por último, se mostrarán varias demostraciones prácticas sobre sistemas PKES disponibles comercialmente, así como una demostración en un coche real.
IoT/ICS Pentest Engineer en Titanium Industrial Security. Interesado en todo lo relacionado con hacking, hardware, radio, etc. Escritor de varios artículos en el blog de seguridad informática TheHackerWay

You Deleted the User. Their Data Didn’t Die.

Marília Rocha


A user opens their account settings and clicks Delete my account. A confirmation dialog appears, the request returns successfully, and the interface shows a friendly message: “Your account has been deleted.” Has it? In the primary database, probably yes. The row is gone, or at least flagged. But in the seconds, days and months before that click, the same person’s data may have passed through a read replica, a Redis cache, a reverse proxy access log, an application log, a distributed trace, an APM agent, a SIEM pipeline, a Kafka topic consumed by several microservices, an analytics platform, a nightly warehouse load, a CRM, a support ticketing tool and a backup job. None of them necessarily heard about the deletion. The presentation starts with a deliberately simple web application and grows it, step by step, into the kind of distributed architecture many people in the room will recognise from their own work. Each new component arrives together with the technical reason it exists. After every step the same two questions come back: where does the personal data live now, and what would have to happen for it to disappear? Not every organisation runs all of these systems, and the architecture on screen is not a description of any specific company. The components are common patterns, and the propagation paths are the ones that naturally appear when those patterns are combined. The second half moves from diagnosis to design. It covers event-driven deletion and how it fails, privacy-aware logging, the particular difficulty of backups, data lineage as a practical engineering artefact, and a set of architecture patterns that reduce the number of places personal data can end up. The approach is technical throughout. Regulation appears only where it explains why the problem matters; the focus stays on systems, data flows and design decisions
Marília Rocha, known as malwarilia, is a Privacy Engineer and Application Security professional based in Porto, Portugal. Her work sits where software architecture, security and personal data meet: understanding how applications collect and move data, finding the places where security controls and privacy requirements overlap, and helping engineering teams build systems that are easier to secure and easier to reason about. Vulnerability Management is an important part of her background, and it shapes how she approaches privacy. She tends to treat privacy problems the way vulnerabilities are treated: as issues with technical root causes that need owners, evidence and follow-up, not only policy statements. Her experience also covers Web Security, DevSecOps, security risk and GRC, and she takes part in bug bounty programs

Recovering a Proprietary Building Intercom Protocol with Consumer-Grade Hardware

Kirils Solovjovs


This talk explores the reverse engineering of the proprietary DUOX PLUS intercom system, focusing on its digital signaling, identification methods, and security weaknesses. Using hardware tools like oscilloscopes, logic analyzers, breadboards, and other simple tools most hackers have lying around we demonstrate signal acquisition, modulation analysis, circuit board reconstruction, firmware extraction, and protocol recovery. The DUOX PLUS system is a digital, non-polarized two-wire intercom and video entry system, which is widely used in residential and commercial security installations in Europe and Asia. While proprietary and closed-source, its extensive deployment raises critical security questions about its robustness against interception and spoofing. This talk details an ongoing effort to reverse engineer the DUOX PLUS protocol by analyzing its electrical characteristics, digital signaling, and communication structure. Through oscilloscope probing and logic analysis, we uncover how the system transmits and authenticates calls, video streams, and access control signals.
Kirils Solovjovs is Latvia's leading white-hat hacker and IT policy activist. He began programming at age 7, and by grade 9 was already writing machine code directly in a hex editor during lunch breaks. Renowned for uncovering and responsibly disclosing critical vulnerabilities in national and international systems, he is an expert in network flow analysis, reverse engineering, and social engineering. A lifelong command-line enthusiast, he uses bash daily for hacking, automation, and large- scale data processing. He is the author of the jailbreak tool for MikroTik RouterOS and played a pivotal role in developing e-Saeima, the world's first fully remote legislative system used by the Latvian Parliament. Today, Kirils serves as lead researcher at Possible Security

Your Travel eSIM Is Talking Behind Your Back

Pedro Cabrera and Javier Valero


We investigate the infrastructure behind apparently independent eSIM brands, the relationship between SM-DP+ servers, IMSI issuers, roaming networks and data breakout points, and the communications initiated by the eSIM towards the mobile device and external infrastructure.The most unexpected findings came from the eSIM itself. Seven profiles initiated IP-based communications using the SIM Toolkit / USAT OPEN CHANNEL mechanism. These connections reached remote endpoints that were diZerent from both the provisioning infrastructure and the observed Internet egress infrastructure. Three providers were observed communicating with the same destination, suggesting shared backend or OTA infrastructure. We also observed PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION activity at unusually high rates in several profiles and background SMS activity during and after activation. In particular, we aim to determine whether a customer-facing eSIM brand can be reliably associated with the infrastructure actually providing the service, where user traZic really exits, and what the eSIM itself does after activation without explicit user interaction. The investigation is based on 20 commercially purchased travel eSIM profiles and combines network traZic capture, SIM/eSIM analysis, infrastructure correlation and analysis of SIM Toolkit / USAT behavior. The broader objective is to provide security researchers with a repeatable methodology for investigating the hidden trust boundaries and dependencies of modern travel eSIM services
Pedro Cabrera is an Industrial Engineer and cybersecurity researcher specialized in telecommunications security and mobile network hacking. He has more than 20 years of experience in telecommunications and security research, with a particular focus on 2G/3G/4G/5G networks, SIM/eSIM security, SDR and telecom penetration testing. Pedro is the CEO of Ethon Shield, a cybersecurity company specialized in telecommunications security, where he leads security assessments and research involving mobile networks, RAN, core networks, SIM/eSIM technologies and private 5G environments.

Villages

 
A Hacking Village is an educational activity to help to the community to share and practice hacking and cybersecurity skills. The main purpose is to share and interact with small groups achieving the main topic of the village, also interact between participants in small activities parallel to conferences. In this way you can choose assisting to an introductory workshop or chasing criminals while in other room a speaker is talking about some new hacking.

Hacking Village will be proposed by staff, but final format will be closed by both parts (staff and leader). The main purpose is, one more time, show and share skills / techniques in some areas and not to show commercial products and services.

You'll be able to enjoy villages if you are enrolled in Cybersecurity Track.

The final list, requirements, and room names will be published in this section on October, the 20th, meanwhile we will be publishing bits of information.

This section is being updated every day

Village: INICIACIÓN AL HARDWARE HACKING DESDE 0

Leader: David Reguera Garcia


INICIACIÓN AL HARDWARE HACKING DESDE 0

Durante el curso de 4 horas aprenderemos a utilizar el Bus Pirate v6 como herramienta de hardware hacking y trabajaremos directamente con hardware real:

- Cómo utilizar Bus Pirate v6
- Uso de analizador lógico
- Introducción práctica a SPI
- Introducción práctica a I²C
- Cómo identificar y comunicarnos con chips
- Dumpear memorias I²C y SPI
- Flashear/escribir memorias
- Lectura, modificación y escritura de datos

La idea es que al terminar puedas coger una placa, conectar el Bus Pirate y empezar a trastear con hardware de verdad.

Material de aprendizaje cedido en préstamo para 12 personas

Si alguien quiere comprarse el material puede traerlo:

HARDWARE NECESARIO

- Bus Pirate v6
https://dirtypcbs.com/store/designer/details/ian/6667/bus-pirate-6-rp2350b-with-enclosure?ref=buspirate.com

- Bus Pirate Probe Cable Kit
https://dirtypcbs.com/store/designer/details/ian/6619/bus-pirate-5-probe-cable-kit

- Bus Pirate Auxilary Cable Kit
https://dirtypcbs.com/store/designer/details/ian/6620/auxilary-cable-kit

- Cable USB C - Selecciona: 0.5m
https://www.amazon.es/SUNGUY-trenzado-transferencia-Android-compatible/dp/B0B2JZXW8L/

- Cable USB 2.0 A a Mini USB B - Selecciona: 0.2
https://www.amazon.es/dp/B07FW69HNT

- Analizador lógico
https://amzn.eu/d/00evkMDC

- Kit Cables Dupont - Selecciona: 1set 10CM
https://es.aliexpress.com/item/1005007072081464.html

- I2C EEPROM AT24C256 - Selecciona: Color: AT24C 256
https://es.aliexpress.com/item/1005009134670156.html

- SPI FLASH W25Q64 - Selecciona: Color: W25Q64 64Mbit
https://es.aliexpress.com/item/1005012354398183.html

- PCB clip 6p 2,54mm - Selecciona: Color: 6P single
https://es.aliexpress.com/item/1005005502613697.html

SOFTWARE NECESARIO

- Windows 11 instalado de forma nativa

Es obligatorio utilizar Windows 11 instalado directamente en el ordenador.

No se admitirán:
X Máquinas virtuales
X Otros sistemas operativos
X Entornos virtualizados

Programas que debes instalar previamente

- Logic 2 for Windows
https://www.saleae.com/downloads

- Tera Term
https://github.com/TeraTermProject/teraterm/releases
Offensive hardware hacking & firmware dev, OS internals, C/C++, assembler, reversing, forensics, x86_64, AVR, ARM, PIC. Ex malware researcher

Schedule

 
Final Cybersecurity Track Schedule will be sent by email to registered assistants

Interesting Places around / How to arrive?

 

Important Dates

  • Call For Papers Requests closing: october, 15th 2026 100%
  • Call For Papers Approval: October, 20th 2026 50%
  • Schedule publication: October 20th, 2026. 0%
  • Cybersecurity Track: November, 26-27th 2026 (MALLORCA) 0%
 

Address

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Location